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Several algorithms have been proposed to implement intrusion detection systems (IDS)
based on the idea that anomalies in the behavior of a system might be produced by a set
of actions of an intruder or by a system fault. Almost no previous research has been
conducted in the area of anomaly detection for high performance clusters.
The research reported in this thesis demonstrates that the analysis of sequences of function calls issued by one or more processes can be used to verify the correct execution of
parallel programs written in C/C++ with the Message Passing Interface (MPI) in a cluster
of Linux workstations. The functions calls were collected via library interposition. Two
anomaly detection algorithms previously reported to be effective methods for anomaly
detection in sequences of system calls, Hidden Markov Model and sequence matching,
were implemented and tested. In general, the simpler sequence matching algorithm outperformed the Hidden Markov Model.

As a result of our experiments, MPIguard, the first distributed-IDS approach for a highperformance environment was implemented and a new dataset for the anomaly detection
community was generated. MPIguard is highly portable and can be used as performance
analysis tool or as a fault detection mechanism.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Several algorithms have been proposed to implement intrusion detection systems (IDS)
based on the idea that anomalies in the normal behavior of a system might be produced by
a set of actions of an intruder or by a system fault. Different components of an information
system can be modeled by using different types of data. Network traffic, resource usage,
operating system calls and log events are among the most important. However, we know
of no previous work in IDS architectures that applies artificial intelligence techniques to
the analysis of data collected from a high performance environment to detect abnormal
behavior.
One of the first algorithms used to analyze traces from UNIX processes was implemented by Forrest and Longstaff [12]. They also produced and published a complete
dataset of process traces that is widely used for testing system call analysis algorithms.
Such algorithms generally are used to analyze the behavior of standard programs like
sendmail or lpr. The same technique might be used to detect anomalies from any program
given a considerable library of sample traces.
However, “as user-level library functions replace operating system calls as the preferred way for programs to efficiently use system services, the range of program activities
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observable via system call tracing will decrease further. This will increase the need to
monitor within applications and their libraries” [28, p.3]. Others data streams have also
been used by researchers to implement IDSs. Examples include CORBA method invocations [36] and language library calls [18].
Actual UNIX and Linux systems support collection of information in real time from
any process, including parallel programs implemented in C with a Message Passing Interface (MPI) architecture. With such techniques a tool can be deployed to restrict the
execution of programs by enforcing a security policy on the network, memory and file
accesses. This method is known as sandboxing because the target process is confined inside a safe environment. Another method used to control the execution of a process is a
real-time host-based anomaly detector. Such a technique allows detection of deviations of
the current process from a database that represents the ”normal” behavior of the program.
The database can be described in term of rules, state-transition machines, performance
statistics, etc.
Figure 1.1 (taken from Ko, Fink and Levitt [19]) shows the behavior model of privileged programs. As we can see, the dotted lines correspond to security-relevant behavior
of the program that can be gathered with audit trails, and it is different from the expected
behavior (a benign program) and the actual behavior (possibly bad behavior). Some techniques control the expected behavior of a program (e.g. analysis of the source code),
whereas others only check footprints of potentially bad behavior. As an example, in the
model proposed by Ko, Fink and Levitt [19], sandboxing can be implemented by using
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audit trials to create a specification-based model of intended behavior. The same model
can be applied to a real time anomaly-detector.

Figure 1.1 Programs behavior

A cluster of workstations is a special environment of interest because generally parallel
programs running in such a distributed environment represent large and periodic tasks, and
they can be modeled by using the same techniques used to create a signature of a process
in a single host. Thus, we present the design of an anomaly detection model for a cluster
of workstations that applies some of the concepts of sandboxing, performance monitoring
and intrusion detection.

4
1.1 Motivation

As previously mentioned, we know of no work that has been published that applies
artificial intelligence techniques to the analysis of data collected from a high speed network
to detect abnormal behavior. Furthermore, given the amount of data produced in such
an environment, many of the algorithms described in the literature cannot be used for
detecting anomalies in (near) real time.
Data management and retrieval have also become interesting problems. Warrender et
al. compared different algorithms for analysis of system calls and concluded that “perhaps
a disproportionate amount of attention has been directed to the data modeling problem,
and that equal attention should be paid to considering what are the most effective data
streams to monitor”[43, p.145].
Finally, although a number of applications have been implemented to gather data from
the execution of an MPI program via library interposition (Rabenseifner [30],Vetter and
Supinski [41] among others), none were developed with intrusion detection as an objective.
We have created a flexible tool to collect data useful not only for our anomaly detection
framework, but also for the research community in the field of anomaly detection.

1.2 Hypothesis and main goals

We want to demonstrate that sequences of function calls can be used to verify the
correct execution of an MPI parallel program in a cluster of Linux workstations.
The main goals of this research are:
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1. Deploy an anomaly detector in a cluster of workstations able to verify the correct execution of parallel applications written in the C/MPI language. This detector should
be accurate and produce low overhead.
2. Compare and contrast the detection rate and the performance of different machine
learning algorithms for the anomaly detection task using function call traces of parallel programs. Function calls are captured using an interposition library mechanism.
3. Generate and document a new dataset for the IDS community.

1.3 Organization

The remainder of this document is organized as follows:
Chapter II presents a survey of algorithms and concepts used in this research.
Chapter III provides a brief analysis of MPIguard.
Chapter IV describes three algorithms used for anomaly detection.
Chapter V shows the accuracy and performance of our offline detection algorithms.
Chapter VI presents MPIguard in online mode.
Finally, Chapter VII reviews the most important characteristics of MPIguard and
discusses limitations and future work.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Intrusion detection systems

An intrusion detection system (IDS) is an important component of the computer and
information security framework, and its main goal is to differentiate between normal activities of a system and behavior that can be classified as suspicious or intrusive. Generally, it
consists of a set of sensors, a set of analyzers and a user interface [1]. An IDS can be classified given the method used to detect the intrusion as an anomaly based or misuse based
detection system [37]. An anomaly detection system assumes that an intrusion modifies
the system behavior from its normal pattern. This approach can use statistical methods,
sequence analysis or predictive pattern generation among others. In a misuse detection
system, the IDS assumes that an intrusion can be detected by matching the current activity
with a set of intrusive patterns (generally defined by security experts or “underground” web
sites). Examples of methods used for misuse detection include expert systems, keystroke
monitoring, and look-up tables for state-transition analysis.
Others classifications include the type of architecture of the IDS: centralized or decentralized [37], the level of the detection: application, host, network, or multinetwork; and
the time in which the intrusion is detected: offline or online [1].
6
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The accuracy of an IDS depends not only on the algorithm used, but also on the quality
of the data used for training and testing. The creation of such data is not an easy task, because it involves a knowledge of networking, operating systems, programming languages
and information security. The generation of normal data (attack free) depends on system
wide features such as the topology and architecture of the network, the number and type
of hosts, users, etc. Thus, one of the first steps to create a complete dataset is to define the
best way to gather representative data of the system being studied. For instance, in order to
create data for the DARPA-MIT intrusion detection evaluation three different approaches
were considered [4]:

1

1. Collect real operational Air Force network traffic.
2. Preprocess real traffic changing sensitive data
3. Create an abstract model of the traffic to generate normal and attack patterns on a
private network (this last approach was used for the 1998 and 1999 evaluations).

Another well-known data set for (host-based) intrusion detection was created at the
University of New Mexico [12]. This repository 2 contains real and synthetic executions
of different UNIX programs, with some intrusions such as buffer overflows, symbolic link
attacks, and Trojan horse programs. Finally, it is important to note that no work has been
done in a high performance environment to create similar datasets and make them available
to the research community
1

Accessible from http://ideval.ll.mit.edu

2

Currently stored in http://www.cs.unm.edu/ immsec/systemcalls.htm
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2.2 Sandboxing

The process of verifying a program’s behavior can be done at compilation time or
execution time. At compilation time (static checking), the flow and properties of the algorithm are verified taking into account a set of rules representing the host policy (a typical
example is the Java Byte-Code Verifier). On the other hand, the runtime checker performs
a verification of all “dangerous methods,” such as network connections and files accesses
while the program is being executed.

2.2.1

Certified code

Certified code is the method used to verify security properties of untrusted source
code. Before running the application, “the host checks annotations and proves that they imply the host’s security policies” [42, p.1]. Examples of certified code include the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), Efficient Code Certification (ECC), and Proof-carrying code (PCC)
[42]. However, those methods concentrate exclusively on standard safety properties. On
the other hand, systems like the Walker’s Secure Automata [42] can apply any policy (described in terms of states and transitions) at compilation time. Afterwards, the verification
module in this architecture checks the resulting code and links the program with the rest
of the application.
As an example, Figure 2.1 (taken from Walker [42]) shows a single policy for a remote
applet that can be expressed as: do not perform a send operation over the network after
reading a file in the host.
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Figure 2.1 Simple state-transition rule

2.2.2

Java

Java contains a large set of security features that allow a host to run remote classes
(and local ones) without risk. Basically, the Java Security Module is composed of the
Byte-Code Verifier, the Applet Class Loader and the Security Manager. The Byte-Code
Verifier is a static process that validates the untrusted code before it is executed. Also,
Java is a type-safe language: “the compiler ensures that methods and programs do not
access memory in ways that are inappropriate” [26] . The Applet Class Loader and the
Security Manager handle the execution of the applet at runtime. In Figure 2.2 (taken from
Sun Microsystems [26]) we can see that the Java compiler creates trusted byte-code in the
local host, whereas the Byte-Code Verifier checks the untrusted code. Then, the applet
class loader fetches the applet’s code from the remote host, creates a namespace (to prevent replacing system-levels components) and forbids the execution of native class loader
processes. While the applet is being executed, the Security Manager controls the socket
operations, files access, thread integrity and verifies the access to other Java packages.
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Figure 2.2 Java security

2.2.3

Janus

Janus is a set of tools that allows the execution of Linux processes in a restricted
environment [14]. Such a restriction is defined by security policies written by the system
administrator, and its main objective is to disallow harmful system calls. Janus is built
upon the following assumption: “An application can do little harm if its access to the
underlying operating system is appropriately restricted” [14, p.1] . The policy modules are
dynamically loaded at runtime. Thus, each host, user or even application can be assigned
a different policy. An example of a security policy is:
1. The application cannot execute chdir (change directory).
2. Access paths containing the string “..” are denied.
3. The application can read some generic files, like shared libraries or configuration
files, but access to other files is restricted.
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Janus itself is intended to be secure, because the design and the implementation is based
on simplicity, and the whole Janus architecture has less that 4500 lines of code, and a
detailed code review can be done to assure a secure (trusted) environment.

2.2.4

Execution monitor

The Execution Monitor restricts the execution of privileged programs- those with
the ability to bypass the kernel’s security mechanisms, like sendmail or finger [19]. For
each target program, a policy (a database of logical expressions) is defined to allow and
disallow different system calls. The trace of a program produced by the operating system
(using tracing tools llike the Sun BSM log) is transformed into logical expressions that
are compared with the policy in real time. If the system finds a mismatch, a violation is
reported.

2.3 Monitoring a cluster of computers

A large collection of tools available to monitor the behavior of a cluster of workstations has been designed to analyze network information. Although networking is the
most critical component in a high-performance computer, monitoring the communication
among workstations is not enough to describe the system behavior. “Also, unlike in general purpose networks, in most cluster setups it is possible -and worthy- to install custom
agents in the nodes” [2, p.59].
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Typical intrusion detection systems face the problem of large data volume due to the
speed of communication and processors. This situation often causes the number of false
positive and false negative alarms to become unacceptably high. The possibility of detecting an intrusion in such an environment in real time is a difficult task. In addition,
the generation of useful information may require computational resources that the cluster
could spend on others tasks. For that reason, the definition of the level and the correct
representation of the data that should be generated (and stored) for the IDS is a complex
problem.
Interposition library techniques (discussed in some detail in the following chapters)
has been used successfully to monitor MPI (Message Passing Interface) programs. Some
of the implementations try to detect typical programming errors in MPI, whereas others
use this technique to create logs and statistical reports. For instance, Umpire “monitors
the MPI operations of an application by interposing itself between the application and the
MPI runtime system using the MPI profiling layer” [41, p.1] . This tool checks for specific
behavior patterns to detect, among others, deadlock and resource exhaustion. Figure 2.3
(taken from Vetter and Supinski [41]) describes this process.
Function calls from the MPI application are captured by the MPI profiling layer and
are transmitted to a central agent, the Umpire Manger, via shared memory to analyze and
verify the execution of the parallel program. The shared memory corresponds to a specific
region of memory that is accessible by the MPI profiler and the Umpire Manager. This
reduces overhead dramatically.
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Figure 2.3 The Umpire manager

As another example, Rabenseifner [30] implements an automatic MPI counter profiling
by using the concept of an interposition library to gather the number of function calls, the
time spent and the total number of bytes at the end of a parallel job. This information is
stored in a file and it is used to create statistical reports each week and month. Figure 2.4
(taken from Rabenseifner [30]) shows the general architecture of the Automatic Counting
Profiling.
This tool is able to gather information such as number of processes, wall clock time
of the application, and number of calls to each MPI function (because of the amount of
information, the counter is only incremented after 128 calls)
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Figure 2.4 The automatic counting profiling tool
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2.4 System call analysis

“A system call is usually a request to the operating system (kernel) to do a hardware/system specific or privileged operation” [15] . Generally it is implemented by using
the syscall() low-level command, which accepts as parameters the number of the system
call and its arguments. A UNIX-like system has more than 150 system calls.
Function libraries are high-level implementations of system services, allowing the execution of language primitives, complex functions and system calls. Thus, we can consider
that the function calls from the C standard library are placed in a layer above the defined
system calls. We also can assume that the problems faced by researchers analyzing system
calls are similar to the problems encountered when analyzing functions calls.
In the field of machine learning and data mining, many algorithms are used to solve
the problem of analysis of temporal sequences of events. However, the brief discussion
presented here describes only some of the algorithms used for the system call analysis task
in the intrusion detection area.
Forrest and Longstaff [12] reported one of the first research projects taking this approach. They used sequences of system calls within a window size (the length of the
sequence) to compare exact matches between the normal profile and the new trace of a
process. This is known as the stide algorithm. An extended overview is described in [35].
Given the following trace of system calls (without parameters):

open, read, mmap, mmap, open, read, mmap
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We can generate several consecutive sequences of length k. With k=3 we have:
open, read, mmap
read, mmap, nmap
mmap, mmap, open
mmap, open, read
This information is stored in a tree structure and corresponds to the database of normal
behavior. When a new (unseen) sequence is presented, the system tries to find it in the
tree. If it is not found in the tree, a counter of anomalies is increased. If this value exceeds
a user threshold, an alarm is fired. An additional measure to detect an anomaly in the stide
algorithm is the difference between the abnormal sequence (i.e. not presented in the tree)
and the normal ones. This can be achieved finding the minimal Hamming distance [12].
An improvement over the stide algorithm is t-stide algorithm: it stores the frequency for
each sequence in the database. Then, rarely matched sequences (for instance sequences
with a frequency of 0.001%) in the data presented to the system will be also labeled as
anomalous [12]. Another frequency-based algorithm is the EMERALD system [29], where
the model compares short-term frequencies with the database of historical distribution.
Somayaji [33] extends some of this concepts to create pH, a system able to detect and
respond to changes in sequences of system calls. When an process is behaving unusually,
pH responds by slowing down the system calls of such a process.
Eschenauer [7] implements host-based anomaly detection using the same concept, but
he also describes other footprints that can be analyzed, such as the EIP (program counter)
from the system call issuer.
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Markov processes are widely used to model systems in terms of state transitions. Some
intrusion detection algorithms that exploit the Markov property implement Hidden Markov
Models(HMM), Markov chains, and sparse Markov trees. Lane [38] used HMMs to profiler user identities for the anomaly detection task. An open problem with this profiling
technique is the ability to select appropiate model parameters. Others experiments performed by Warrender, Forrest and Pearlmutter [43] compared the HMM with algorithms
such as s-tide and RIPPER. They concluded that the Hidden Markov Model exhibited the
best performance of the models considered but was the most computationally expensive.
Eskin et al. [8] constructed a probabilistic prediction model able to determine the last
system call of a given sequence by using sparse Markov trees. An important contribution
of this work is the use of information theory to find the minimum entropy of the data
set. Experimental results showed that the system achieves the best performance using the
minimum entropy to compute the value of the window size.
One of the most widely used rule-based algorithms in the intrusion detection field is
the Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error Reduction (RIPPER) [3]. This is a
rule learning system developed by William Cohen. His algorithm performs classification
by creating a list of rules from a set of labeled training examples. RIPPER also is used for
anomaly detection by Lee and Stolfo [23] to predict system calls, where the classification
label of each training example corresponds to the last call of the sequence. Each generated
rule is associated with a number called confidence, given by the equation



(2.1)
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where M corresponds to the number of records that satisfies the rule’s conditions, and T is
the number of times the prediction of the rule was corrected. If a new (unseen) sample is
presented to the system and violates high-confidence rules (for instance, with a confidence
greater than 80%) the sample is labeled as an anomaly.
The same concept of prediction of sequence calls can be implemented using neural
networks [20]. The main advantages of such an approach are the lack of dependence on
any statistical assumption, noise tolerance, and abstraction.
In previous work [24] we have successfully applied three different neural network
topologies (multilayer perceptron trained with backpropagation, radial basis functions
trained with a perceptron and self-organizing maps) to detect attacks on well-known UNIX
programs, such as lpr and sendmail. Multiple self-organizing maps have also been for used
network intrusion detection in [32].
We have demonstrated [10, 11] that the accuracy of such neural networks can be improved by applying Adaboost (a boosting by resampling technique). In some experiments
we were able to improve the classification rate by 15% or more, achieving in some cases
100% accuracy in the detection of anomalies.
Finally, Wespi et al. [44] present an intrusion detection system using pattern matching
with fixed and variable length sequences. The first method uses a static table to try to
find an exact (or similar) match of the new sequence, whereas the last method uses a tree
to store each normal pattern, taking into account that several patterns start with the same
string. The intrusion detection described in their work executes filtering, reduction and
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aggregation of the sequences (for the experiments, they used audit events from the FTP
daemon). Their results show that the concept of variable length sequences improves the
IDS accuracy.

2.5 Process monitoring

Operating systems give the user several tools to control the execution of a process in
real-time. We are interested in the implementation of a dynamic library to collect information from function calls, but others mechanisms can be used to achieve such a goal.

2.5.1

Library interposition

The link editor (ld) in a Linux operating system builds dynamically linked executables
(although it can also build statically linked programs). Building “incomplete” executables,
the link editor allows the incorporation of different objects in real time. The communication between the main program and the objects is done by shared memory operations.
Such (shared) objects are called dynamic libraries: “A dynamic library consists of a set
of variables and functions which are compiled and linked together with the assumption
that they will be shared by multiple processes simultaneously and not redundantly copied
into each application” [5, p.1]. The dynamic library is linked without an entry point (i.e.
without an inclusion of the program prologue crt0) [13]. In other words, a dynamic library
cannot be executed by itself. As an example, take the simplest C program: the “Hello
world” application (hello.c), which contains [13]:
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printf (”Hello World”);
Generally, the user compiles this program with a command like this:
cc -o hello hello.c
Such a command line invokes:
ld -e Start -dc -dp -o hello /lib/crt0.o hello.o -lc
The ld command creates an incomplete hello executable, requiring the inclusion of
the C standard library, libc.so.V (V is the current version) at execution time. When printf
is executed, ld.so, the execution-time linker, searches in the symbol table of the hello
application and then the libc.so library for the definition of any command named ”printf”
with the same parameters. Because this is a standard C function, printf from the libc.so
library is executed. Afterwards, the execution-time environment saves a pointer with the
reference of such a function to avoid searching again [13].
In a Linux system, the link editor uses the LD PRELOAD environment variable to
search for the user’s dynamic libraries [5]. Using this feature, the operating system gives
the user the option of interposing a new library. Interposition is “the process of placing
a new or different library function between the application and its reference to a library
function” [5]. Thus, the library interposition technique allows intercepting the function
calls without the modification or recompilation of the dynamically linked target program.
By default the C compilers in LINUX use dynamic linking. Furthermore, “most parts
of the Linux libc package are under the Library GNU Public License, though some are
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under a special exception copyright like crt0.o. For commercial binary distributions this
means a restriction that forbids statically linked executables” [15]. The user functions (i.e.
the functions inside the interposition library with the same prototype as the “real” ones)
are able to check, record and even modify the arguments and the response of the original
function call. Other advantages include [5]:
1. A subset of the library can be profiled instead of the whole library.
2. Different levels of profiling can be generated.
3. Nesting levels inside the library can be controlled.

The main disadvantage of the interposition library technique is that it can be bypassed
by calling functions at a lower level (for instance, executing system call interruptions)
[17]. The process of searching for the symbol table in the new interposition library and the
allocation of memory does increase the execution time of the target process. As an example, Kuperman and Spafford ([21]) present some experiments that show that functions not
defined in the shared library are slowed by 340 nanoseconds, whereas functions defined
are slowed by 6.53 microseconds on a Red Hat Linux 5.2 machine.
The interposition library technology is widely used and many wrappers and tools have
been implemented. Curry [5] shows an application of this technique in detail with the
Shared Library Interposer (SLI) library. In his work, Curry describes the new problems
that arise because of the interception of calls from the libc.so. As an example, the interposer program might use libc functions to perform the profiling, and these calls should not
be taken into account.
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2.5.2

Other techniques

UNIX and Linux operating systems provide a large collection of mechanisms to trap
system and function calls from any process. For instance, to monitor kernel calls, the
OS provides the tools strace, trace and truss [21]. However they only record kernel level
functions, and the trap mechanism produces too much overhead [5].
Interception of system calls can be built inside the OS kernel by adding code extensions. This allows low interception overhead and speed (used for real-time applications),
but the system itself is “less secure” by adding extensions, and the implementation requires
super-user privileges (it requires kernel modification), so it will affect any process in the
upper layers of the OS [17].
By using the ptrace() special system call a target process can be monitored by another program. When the kernel reads a system call from the target program, the monitor
awakes and takes control. Before the kernel processes the call, the monitor can do a precall process [14]. After the system call is executed by the kernel, it is able to do a post-call
process. The monitoring process can extend Linux (and other POSIX system) capabilities
to modify system call data and it is considered very efficient. However, overhead is required to provide a secure monitoring process, and ptrace() traces every system call, not
just the interesting ones. Also in many operating systems it is impossible to abort a system
call without killing the process being monitored [14]. A similar monitoring mechanism
can be implemented with the /proc interface instead of ptrace() [14].

CHAPTER III
SYSTEM OVERVIEW
We present MPIguard, a new architecture to verify the correct execution of parallel
programs (written in C/MPI) over a Linux cluster by monitoring library calls issued in
each host. The system is designed as a host-based anomaly detector similar to sandboxing
architectures . It is able to control in (near) real-time a process being executed.
A program might violate the policy of the system (stored as a database of legal traces
of the program) because of the following conditions:
1. Corrupted MPI programs
2. Corrupted data.
3. Deadlocks.
4. Failure of cluster components (such as networking or disk failures).

Modification of a program’s source code is very unlikely in a “closed” cluster environment, where the security policies of one (or more) central nodes control the access of
the users to the cluster. The risk of corrupted MPI programs is higher for “enterprise” or
“non dedicated” clusters, where each node is able to connect to the Internet to access a remote database or a remote service. However, we assume that an unauthorized user cannot
modify MPIguard by changing setup files or removing components.
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MPIguard uses an interposition library technique to store on disk the function calls
from the standard C and the MPI/PRO libraries (although many others can be profiled) in
a Linux node. This trace file represents the normal behavior of each one of the MPI programs that the system administrator wants to control. Somayaji defines normal behavior
as “behavior that is observed when we are reasonably certain no activity is occurring that
requires non-routine direct human administrative observation and interaction” [33, p.92].
Note that this definition of normal behavior includes not only security-related events, but
also misconfigurations and failures in the system.
When an MPI program is being executed, the current sequence of function calls is
compared with the normal trace of the program. If MPIguard detects that the program is
behaving unusually an alarm is fired.
It is important to note that our system can be adapted to include several policy and
recovery rules, like the one presented in Figure 3.1. In this example any memory request
of more than 2000 Kbytes of memory with the function malloc (memory allocation) is
forbidden.

Figure 3.1 Simple security policy
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MPIguard assumes that the parallel program follows the Single Program Multiple Data
(SPMD) paradigm, i.e. the same program is executed in all the nodes of the cluster. This
implies that the anomaly detector in each one of the nodes of the cluster is trained with the
same dataset 1 . However, a parallel application running different processes in each node
(no SPMD) could be monitored with MPIguard by using a trace file for each of the nodes.

3.1 A test environment

MPIguard was implemented and tested with a Linux cluster built at Mississippi State
University in the Computer Science Department. This cluster contains one head node
(microcosm0) and 8 slaves, each with 4 processors. The nodes are fully connected with
Ethernet and Giganet (high-speed) networks. Figure 3.2 shows this architecture.

3.2 Interposition library

This library captures function calls (with their parameters) from a MPI/PRO executable. It performs two main processes:
1. Send information about the function to the Profiler and the Analyzer.
2. Execute the function.

MPIguard automatically generates the source code needed to gather information from any
function. Figure 3.3 shows the template used to generate the code for any MPI/C function.
1

Many of the real-world applications written in MPI follow the SPMD paradigm.
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Figure 3.2 Head node architecture of the Linux cluster

The system administrator interacts with MPIguard indicating which functions and parameters will be analyzed. Basically, a configuration file is used to describe the type, the
name and the parameters of the functions. Figure 3.4 shows an example of this file. Code
is an internal code for each function (this value is stored on disk instead of the real name
of the function) and Parameter to store in disk is the parameter (an integer that generally
corresponds to some buffer’s size) that will be written in the log file. A value of -1 indicates that the function’s parameter is not important for the user or the function has no
parameters.
Using the template described in Figure 3.3 and the information of MPI Send in Figure 3.4, MPIguard is able to generate the source code shown in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.3 Template for any MPI or C function in MPIguard

Figure 3.4 Configuration file with the functions to be analyzed by MPIguard
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Figure 3.5 Automatic source code for MPISend
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3.3 Profiler

This process receives messages from the interposition library and collects information
about the system calls. Its main goal is to store the program’s normal behavior on disk,
although it can be used to generate the trace of any MPI/C program. This feature allows
storing the traces of different executions of the same program for off-line analysis.
Figure 3.6 shows the interaction between the Profiler and the target process using the
interposition library. As we can see, the interposition library sends information in real
time to the Profiler via shared memory.

Figure 3.6 Interaction between target process and Profiler

30
An example of the Profiler’s output can be seen in Figure 3.7. It is an ASCII file containing the process identifier (PID), the internal code of the function call and the optional
integer parameter.

Figure 3.7 Example of the Profiler’s output

As was mentioned before, including a new library does increase the execution time of
the process. We have executed LLCbench [27], a parallel performance benchmark implemented in the University of Tennessee at Knoxville, to measure the overhead produced
by the interposition library and the Profiler. We have used 4 processors and averaged the
results of 20 experiments.
Figure 3.8 shows the latency of MPI Send (function that sends a message to one processor and blocks the current task until the message is received ) with different packet
sizes. Small packets result in an overhead of a few microseconds and for large packets the
overhead is almost imperceptible.
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Figure 3.8 Comparison of latency with the LLCbench benchmark

Figure 3.9 shows the average bandwidth between the master and one slave processor
using unidirectional transmissions. For small packets (up to 1024 bytes) the shape of the
graph of the benchmark run without the interposition library indicates a somewhat better
bandwidth and for large packets the reduction in the bandwidth is very close to 0.
Different information can be extracted from the log files generated by our Profiler tool,
and it can be used for performance monitoring or debugging. For example, Figure 3.10
shows a summary of the function calls executed by LLCbench-bandwidth in one processor.
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Figure 3.9 Comparison of bandwidth with the LLCbench benchmark

Figure 3.10 Summary of LLCbench Bandwidth in one processor
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3.4 Analyzer

The Analyzer is the principal component of MPIguard and its position in the MPIguard architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.11. This application is trained with the current
executable’s normal behavior (generated by the Profiler).

Figure 3.11 Online analysis of the target process

When MPIguard is running, the interposition library sends sequences of function calls
to the Analyzer in real-time, and the Analyzer compares the current trace with the profile
stored on disk for the program that is being executed. If the sequences are being recognized
as suspicious activities, an alarm is fired. In Chapter IV we will explain the algorithms that
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we have used to detect deviations from normal behavior of parallel programs in the nodes
of a Linux cluster.

3.5 Networking

If the anomaly detector is being executed in real time in each node of the cluster
(i.e. the interposition library and the Analyzer are running), MPIguard can collect all the
process status information at a given time and present it to the system administrator as an
”overall” state of the system. This communication would not dramatically increase the
normal network traffic in the cluster.

3.6 Adding new components

Each component in the MPIguard system can be seen as a software agent. The Profiler
and the Analyzer could potentially receive information from other applications, not only
the instance of the interposition library being executed. Such agents might be able to
monitor CPU usage, authentications and networking. Several architectures using agents
for intrusion detections are described in the literature (e.g. [16, 34]).

CHAPTER IV
ANOMALY DETECTION WITH FUNCTION CALLS
Several algorithms can be implemented to find patterns from a process using information about its function calls (for example, by comparing timings or relative frequencies,
or analyzing the parameters [33]). In our research, we are using Hidden Markov Models
and sequence matching to detect abnormal program behavior using only the type of the
function call and its relative order in a trace.

4.1 Hidden Markov Models

Hidden Markov Models (HMM) are used for modeling sequences of events and are
widely used for speech recognition and DNA sequencing.

4.1.1

Description

“A Hidden Markov Model describes a doubly stochastic process. An HMM’s states
represent some unobservable condition of the system being modeled. In each state, there
is a certain probability of producing any of the observable system outputs and a separate
probability indicating the likely next states” [43, p.135]. Figure 4.1 (adapted from [31]
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shows an ergodic 1 HMM with 4 states. In each state there is a probability of observation
for each of the elements of the alphabet a,b,c,d and e.

Figure 4.1 An ergodic Hidden Markov Model with 4 states and 5 symbols

The elements of an HMM are [31]:
1. N, the number of states.
2. M, the number of distinct observation symbols per state (the alphabet size).
3. A, the state transition probability distribution.
4. B, the observation symbol probability distribution.
5.  , the initial state distribution.
For convenience, an HMM model can be expressed as




(4.1)

Rabiner [31] describes three different problems that must be solved with an HMM
when we have an observation sequence 
1

Every state can be reached from any other state.

 !"$# :
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1. How do we compute %&')(+*-, ?
2. How do we choose the state sequence that best explain ' ?
3. How do we maximize %&')(.*/, adjusting * 0

4.1.2

&214353768, ?

The Baum-Welch algorithm

The Baum-Welch algorithm is generally used to train the transition and symbol probabilities of an HMM [31] (attempting to solve problem 3). This is an iterative algorithm
that computes A, B and 6 based on the concept of forward-backward probabilities. The
forward procedure finds the probability of the partial observation sequence from the first
event to some event O(t) at time t, whereas the backward procedure finds the probability
of the partial observation from O(t+1) to the end.
The forward variable can be defined as
9;: &<=,>0?%@&A'B'CD!D!DE' : 3GF : 0IHJ<K(+*-,

(4.2)

It corresponds to the probability of the partial observation sequence O until time t and state
H/L at time t, given the model * .

The backward variable is the probability of the partial observation from t+1 to the end,
given the state H/L at time t and the model * , and it can be expressed as
M :
&<=,>0?%@&A' !: N B ' !: N C D!D!DE'$OP( F : 0QH/LR3S*/,

(4.3)

The Baum-Welch algorithm updates the model * using the probability of being in state
H/L at time t and state HUT at time t+1, given the model and the observations. This variable,
V :
&<73XWY, is illustrated in Figure 4.2 (taken from [31]).
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Figure 4.2 Reestimation of the HMM model using a joint event

With Z we can compute the probability of being in state [/\ at time t given the model
and observation sequence
]_^`a=b>ced
Z `2aGiXjYb
fGg/h

(4.4)

The initial state distribution can be computed as the expected frequency (number of times)
in state [/\ at time k cml
n \ co] h `2aXb

(4.5)

The state transition probability distribution is given by the expected number of transitions
from the state [/\ to state [ f divided by the expected number of transitions from state [/\
p \ f crq
q

^ g/h Z ^`2aGiXjYb
^ g/h ]_^sa

(4.6)

The observation symbol probability distribution can be computed as the expected number
of times in state j and observing symbol tvu divided by the expected number of times in
state j
w R` xUbyc
\

]Y^` jYb
q ~ ^ K|z  {} g
z
j b
^ g/h ]_^7` Y
q

(4.7)
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Thus, 2GXY can be computed using the new values of X . and AU . This process is
repeated several times until some limiting point is reached.

4.1.3

Anomaly detection with HMMs

In order to train the HMM with the Baum-Welch algorithm, we should specify the
observation sequence O. This is NT, the function call trace of the normal MPI/C program
produced by the profiler. No further preprocessing should be done. With an optimal
model  , we can assume that the probabilities A and B generalize the normal behavior of
the process.
Given a new observation 

(that corresponds to the trace of an unseen instance of the

MPI/C program, named UT), we can apply the following algorithm [43]:
1. Using the model 
2. For each one of the observations $ .




For each one of the states / (if the state can be reached from the previous one,
i.e., if the probability of moving to the current state is greater than some user
threshold  ) .
- If the probability of producing the symbol $ in the current state 7 $
is less than  then the function call in the trace UT is labeled as anomalous
If $ could not be produced by any state (i.e. the function call in the trace
was tagged as anomalous in each state / ) then the counter of anomalies C is
increased.

3. If C exceeds some user threshold  then the entire trace UT is tagged as anomalous.
Although it could be said that comparing the probability of moving to the current state
/ and the probability of producing a symbol $ in the current state with the same user

threshold  has no mathematical foundation, we wanted initially to include the smallest
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number of parameters that we could conceive for the anomaly detection task with the
HMM.
Figure 4.3 shows an example of an ergodic HMM with two states and 3 possible symbols. Using the algorithm described before, with 

¡E¢ and £¤r , Figure 4.4 shows

that the trace CAAC could be produced by that HMM, since there is at least one possible
state producing every symbol ¥$¦ . For instance, in step iii., A could not be produced in
state 1, but it could be produced in state 2 with a probability of 0.4.

Figure 4.3 Example of a trained HMM model

An improvement on this algorithm counts the number of abnormal function calls using
some tolerance factor § . If the number of abnormal function calls between the current
observation ¥$¦ and the last § observations is equal to § , then the counter of anomalies C is
increased. This concept is similar to the locality frame count LFC, used by Somayaji [33],
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Figure 4.4 CAAC is not tagged as anomalous by the HMM

where the main idea is to count the number of anomalies in the last LF calls to estimate
the delay needed to penalize the system calls of the anomalous process.
As an example, if ¨ is 20, and we have only detected 5 anomalies in the last 20 observations, the total counter of anomalies of the MPI/C program is not incremented. This
algorithm is suitable for on-line detection.

4.2 Sequence matching

The sequence matching algorithm is the simplest approach to detect abnormal behavior and security violations of a program.
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4.2.1

Description

We used the sliding window concept that is widely used in the analysis of system
calls [12, 35, 33, 24, 10, 11] to create subsequences of the function calls of an MPI/C
application. The sliding window divides a trace of N function calls into a set of small
sequences, each one of length © (the window size). As an example see in Figure 4.5 a
program trace. With ©«ªI¬ the first sequence can be obtained with positions 1, 2 and 3 in
the trace. The second sequence corresponds to positions 2, 3 and 4. The third is created
using positions 3, 4 and 5 and so on. The result of this process is a database like to the one
presented in Figure 4.6

Figure 4.5 Function calls

Figure 4.6 Subsequences of function calls of length 3

Somayaji has created a formal definition of these subsequences [33]. Let 

be the

alphabet of possible system calls, ®¯ª±° ²° , ³eªm´µ·¶G´¸¶º¹¹¹º¶7´X»¼° ´X½>¾¿ , À the length of T, ©
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the window size ( Á ÂIÃmÂÅÄ ), Æ

the profile (set of patterns associated with Ç and Ã ). A

sequence ÆÉÈAÊAË is defined as
ÆÌÈÊRËÎÍmÏPÐRÑÒ7ÓSÑºÔÖÕ/×SÓØºØØºÓSÑÙ·ÚÜÛYÑºÔ=ÓSÑºÔÖÕ/×SÓºØØØºÓÑSÙÞÝ¤ßàÓºÁàÂáÒ7ÓXâ@ÂáãÓXâä¿Ò/åæÁ$ÍáÃçÓºè

(4.8)

This database can be stored as a sorted tree to perform efficient comparisons. Figure 4.7
shows an example of a profile with a window of length 4.

Figure 4.7 Normal behavior represented by a sorted tree

4.2.2

Anomaly detection with sequence matching

With exact matching, if a sequence éeÍëê

é/ÔRÓ é/ÔÖÕ/×SÓºØ Ø!Ø Ó éUÙ²ì

(from the unseen trace

UT) is not contained in ÆÉÈAÊAË , the sequence é is tagged as anomalous. Researchers have
demonstrated that this method is very efficient and it is able to detect security violations
and software failures [33, 35, 43, 12]. Some modification of this method include:
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1. Compute the Hamming distance between the new sequences í and each one of the
sequence of îÌïðRñ [35].
2. Compute the frequency of each sequence in îÉïAðRñ . If the sequence í (from UT)
matches with a sequence in îÌïðRñ with very low frequency, í is still tagged as anomalous [43].
3. Compute the mismatches rate per sequence [12]. It is important to observe that the
number of anomalies reported by the sequence matching detection algorithm might
exceed the number of abnormal function calls.
As an example take a profile containing sequences of length 3 created with all the
possible combinations of the alphabet a,b,c,d,e. When a new trace such as abXde is
compared with the profile, the sequences abX, bXd, Xde will be flagged as anomalous. However, the only anomalous symbol is X 2 .
The maximum number of mismatches for a sequence of length L and window k is

úoü 

òôóõ÷öøòUù;ú?óRòûöýüþù;úQóAòëö«ÿù;ú

2



òôóõ÷öæóRòàúoüù ÿù

(4.9)

In contrast, the number of anomalies detected by the HMM does correspond to the number of function
calls that can not be generated with the model

CHAPTER V
OFFLINE DETECTION
The main goal of MPIguard is to detect deviations of an MPI/C program from its
expected normal behavior, called the profile. In order to achieve a (near) on-line detection,
we first analyzed the accuracy and efficiency of the algorithms described in Chapter IV.
However we do not know, apriori, any decision boundary between normal and abnormal
instances of MPI/C programs.

5.1 Datasets

We are using MPIguard’s Profiler tool to gather MPI function calls from two programs: IS (“Interger Sort”, included in the NAS parallel benchmark suite [45]) and a very
simple MPI program called ring. It is important to observe that both programs satisfy the
SPMD constraint of MPIguard.
IS sorts keys in parallel with a problem size of



numbers. This program gen-

erates a small trace consisting of about 40 calls in each node using 9 function calls.
The ring application sends messages from one processor to the next one defined in its
MPI COMM WORLD (default handler for MPI communication). The last processor
sends a message to the first one creating a “closed ring“ architecture. This process is
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repeated several times. This program generates a large trace with about 6400 calls in each
node, but using only 5 function calls.
Both programs were executed using 4, 8 and 16 processors in the Linux cluster at Mississippi State University (Figure 3.2). The detection algorithms were run on an Intelx386,
64MB RAM with Linux Mandrake.

5.2 Artificial anomalies

Using MPIGuard’s profiler we can generate a trace of the function calls issued by any
MPI/C program (Figure 3.7). If we can assure that the program is executed under normal
conditions, we can use such trace as a representation of the program’s normal behavior
(profile).

5.2.1

Description

Assuming that possible anomalies of a MPI/C program will generate patterns that are
similar to the profile ([9, 22, 24]), a simple but useful heuristic that can be used to create
a synthetic trace representing abnormal behavior is to randomly change the value of some
of the calls in the “normal” trace. Both the type of the system call and its argument can be
modified.
Torres [39] has implemented two programs that interact with MPIguard’s Profiler files
to generate synthetic datasets. Both programs receive as input a configuration file containing the set of possible functions that can be generated by the MPI/C program. Figure 5.1
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shows an example of the contents of this file. It is a subset of the Profiler’s configuration
file (Figure 3.4).

Figure 5.1 Set of possible function calls

Torres includes in his programs randomlib, a C library to generate random numbers
based on Fibonacci sequences implemented at Florida State University [25]. This is one
of the best algorithms to create random numbers. The artificial anomalies are created
either by modification or by addition:
1. Modification: The type of the function call (internal code) is changed for any other
valid code with a probability (see Figure 5.1).
If the function call is going to be changed, the value of its parameter will also be
modified with a probability of 0.5. Since we assume that the value of the parameter
corresponds to the size of a transmission or a buffer, the new value is a power of 2
less than 65536.

 

of changing the
If the function call does not change, there is a probability of
value of its parameter. Not all the functions have parameters. If this is the case, the
value of the parameter is -1.
2. Addition: A new (valid) function call is created with a probability and the value
of its parameter is generated as a power of 2 less than 65536. In order to create
more diversity, the value of the parameters of the function calls are changed with a
probability of 0.5.
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In our research we have generated anomalies using the addition method. An example
can be seen in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2 Anomaly data generation with addition

Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of artificial anomalies in pattern space that were
injected into a dataset containing a trace of the normal execution of ring in one node.
The x-axis corresponds to the identifier of the function call, the y-axis corresponds to the
position in the trace and the z-axis shows the size of the parameter that was stored on disk
by the Profiler. Although we do not believe that real deviations from an MPI/C program’s
profile contain such a high number of anomalies, the artificial anomaly generator using
addition helps us to demonstrate the ability of detection of our IDS.
Both IS and ring were executed with 4 processors. Selecting any two processors other

 and  !"$# were generated.
Applying the artificial anomaly generation algorithm to   !"% and  !"$# we have
created &('*)+ and &('*)+,# .
than the master node (rank=0) two datasets
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Figure 5.3 Artificial anomalies for ring

5.2.2

Hidden Markov Models

As explained in section 4.1.3, an HMM

-

trained with a dataset representing normal

behavior of an MPI/C program can be used as a profile to detect anomalies. Detection with
this algorithm is very efficient since the trace generated by the MPIguard’s Profiler can be
used directly as input for the detection algorithm without preprocessing.
By training the HMM using the Baum-Welch algorithm we can obtain optimal values
for

. ,/

and

0

. However, we must specify the number of states in the model N and the

threshold for detection

1

(the minimum allowed probability of transition between states

and the minimum allowed probability of producing a symbol) and

2

(the maximum al-

lowed number of anomalous function calls in the trace). We believed we could use HMMs
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with few states because the alphabet size for normal behavior of IS and ring is less than 10.
Since we do not know of any useful heuristic to determine the parameters of the model,
we conducted a set of experiments to determine the impact of

3

and

4

on the accuracy

of the detection. The results of these experiments are plotted in graphs, where the x-axis
correspond to the user threshold

3

and the y-axis correspond to the percent of anomalies

detected in the trace.
The overall shape of the graphs help us to determine the capabilities of the HMM.
For example, in Figure 5.4, the ability of the HMM to represent normal behavior can be
described as

576!8

where X is the maximum

3

3

that can be used to distinguish between

normal and abnormal behavior (when is greater than X, several function calls are labeled
as anomalous no matter what trace is presented to the HMM) and Y is the difference

3

between the number of anomalies detected for normal and abnormal traces when is lower
than X. Y is related with the accuracy of the HMM and X is related with its generalization
capability. If Y is small (close to 0) the HMM is not able to differentiate between normal
and abnormal behavior. If X is small, the probabilities of the matrices A, B and

9

are very

small.
It is important to observe that the area

5:6!8

gives us an idea of the behavior of the

HMM, but it cannot be used to estimate its detection accuracy. In the next chapter we will
compute the total number of anomalies instead of the percent of anomalies in the trace to
compute false positive and false negative rates.
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Figure 5.4 Quality of the HMM

; <=>?@AB
for IS as training data for an HMM with 5 states and CEDGFHDJILKC . When FHMNCK"O the
Figure 5.5 shows the number of anomalies detected by the algorithm using

algorithm detects almost 100% percent of the anomalies for each trace, even for the train-

; <=>?!@"A%B . Thus, the number of false positives is overwhelming. However,
by using CK"PQDRFTSUCVKWO there is a distinction between normal and abnormal traces and by
selecting an appropriate X (e.g. XZYU[\C ) we can accurately classify the program trace with

ing dataset

no false positives or false negatives.
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 show results from the same experiment with 8 and 40 hidden

]

states. Increasing the number of states does not change the detection capability of .
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Figure 5.5 Detecting anomalies of IS using an HMM with 5 states

Figure 5.6 Detecting anomalies of IS using an HMM with 8 states

53

Figure 5.7 Detecting anomalies of IS using an HMM with 40 states

Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 show the detection accuracy using traces from the ring program with 5 and 8 states (we were not able to find
is very large (above 0.8) and by choosing

_Z`Ua\b

^

with 40 states). With these models X

we can achieve perfect accuracy. Again,

increasing the number of states seems not to affect the representation of normal behavior
by the HMM.
Since the alphabet needed to represent normal behavior of IS and ring contains few
symbols, training the HMM is not as computationally expensive as we would expect. For
IS with a small trace containing about 40 calls the Baum-Welch algorithm takes less than 1
second with 5 states and less than 2 seconds with 40 states and For ring with a large trace
containing more than 6000 calls, the Baum-Welch algorithm takes under 240 seconds with
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Figure 5.8 Detecting anomalies of ring using an HMM with 5 states

Figure 5.9 Detecting anomalies of ring using an HMM with 8 states
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5 states and under 150 seconds with 8 states. Testing (detection) using the trained model
takes less than 1 second for both IS and ring.

5.2.3

Sequence matching

Section 4.2.2 described how the profile created using sliding windows can be used to
detect anomalies in an MPI/C program (see Figure 4.7). The only parameter needed for
such an algorithm is the window size
find the impact of

c

c

. The following experiments were conducted to

in the detection accuracy of the basic sequence matching algorithm.

Figure 5.10 shows the percent of anomalies in each trace when comparing different traces
of ring with the profile

d efgh!i"j%k

using 4 window sizes. Note that we are including

d ef gh!i"j$l and mon*p+ef gh!i"j$l . The number
of anomalies detected for the traces def gh!i"j$q and def gh!i"j$l is 0 and the number of
anomalies detected for the traces mon$prefgh!i"j%k , m(n*p+ef gh!i"j$q and mon*p+ef gh!i"j$l is greater
the function call traces of a third processor:

than 20%. Increasing the sequence length in the algorithm does increase the number of
anomalies detected. However we will see in the following chapter that when using the
sequence matching algorithm with real attacks, the window size does not have such an
impact on the detection rate.
Figure 5.11 shows the results the same experiment using IS traces. The behavior of the
algorithm is similar to the one described for ring although the IDS reports that the dataset

mon*p+ef gh!i"j$l

contains more than 40% of anomalies.
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Figure 5.10 Detecting anomalies of ring using Sequence Matching

Figure 5.11 Detecting anomalies of IS using Sequence Matching
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Creating the profile using sorted trees is a very efficient task. The running time for
both training and testing using sequence matching takes under 1 second for both ring and
IS.

5.3 Real attacks

Section 5.2 described a simple heuristic to insert artificial anomalies in the function
call trace of an MPI program executed under normal conditions. Although the datasets
created with these methods were useful to demonstrate the accuracy and efficiency of the
Hidden Markov Model and sequence matching algorithms, we must test MPIguard using
function call traces that represent possible anomalies of a parallel program written with
C/MPI on Linux.

5.3.1

Description

Torres [40] has implemented a set of C routines that simulate anomalies in MPI programs. These routines were adapted to perform experiments with MPIguard and they can
be divided into two main groups:
1. Anomalies are generated by modifiying the source code of an MPI program (ring).
In the following chapters we will refer these anomalies as daemon attacks.

s

s

RingMalloc: Before the parallel execution of the program finalizes (but after
the MPI Finalize call) a background process is created (a daemon). This program attempts to allocate memory N times. We have used N=100 for all the
example attacks.
RingFile: Before the parallel execution of the program finalizes (but after the
MPI Finalize call) a background process is created (a daemon). This program
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t

attempts to allocate memory and read a file N times. If the file can be read, the
process appends artificial data to it.
RingFork: This program is similar to RingMalloc, but every time the process
attempts to allocate memory, a new daemon is created. Since every new daemon is an exact copy of its parent the number of times this process is repeated,
M, has to be very small. Otherwise, the attack will completely blocks the MPI
program until the operating system is able to free resources. We have used M
= 3.

Figure 5.12 shows the distribution of anomalies generated for the daemon attacks for
ring. The x-axis shows the position in the trace and the y-axis displays the identifier
of the function call. The daemon attacks creates anomalies at the beginning and at
the end of the execution of the MPI application.

Figure 5.12 Daemon attack for ring

2. Anomalies are generated by including a new library between libc/libmpi and the
stack of dynamic libraries of the run-time system (i.e. using the same concept of
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interposition library implemented in MPIguard). In the following chapters we will
refer these anomalies as interposer attacks.

u
u

File attack: Every time the MPI program closes a file F with the fclose call, F
is copied to a temporary file located in a directory with read permissions for
any user.
MPI attack: Every time the program executes the MPI calls MPI Initialize
or MPI Finalize a daemon process is created with the same features as the
RingMalloc attack.

Since the original version of ring does not include file management, we have added
a small function to write data into files (note that this function does not affect the
overall behavior of ring). Figure 5.13 shows this new function,

Figure 5.13 New function included in ring to handle files
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Figure 5.14 shows the distribution of anomalies for the interposer attacks with the
ring-modified program.

Figure 5.14 Interposer attacks for ring -modified version-

As explained before, MPIguard’s Profiler can be configured to create a log of any libc
or libmpipro function. In order to detect the daemon and interposer attacks, we need to
include standard C functions from the malloc family (memory allocation), fork family
(process bifurcation),and string and file management among others. It is important to
observe that MPIguard’s profiler only generates traces from the same level of execution in
the program. As an example, a malloc call done by the MPI Send function is not profiled
since MPI Send is being profiled. However, an explicit malloc in the source code will be
profiled.
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With ring the daemon attacks generate 14 different function calls and the interposer
attacks generate 17 function calls. Table 5.1 shows the average of the number of anomalies
generated on a slave node by the daemon and interposer attacks for 3 executions of ring
and ring-modified.

Table 5.1 Average number of anomalies with real attacks
Attack
Daemon-RingMalloc
Daemon-RingFile
Daemon-RingFork
Interposer-File
Interposer-MPI
Interposer-Both

5.3.2

Anomalies
109
409
30
5342
217
5559

Hidden Markov Models

Figure 5.15 shows the accuracy of an HMM trained with normal behavior of ring on
process 2 using 8 states when ring was executed with the daemon attacks. The HMM
is able to distinguish between normal and abnormal behavior when the user threshold is
small (

vTwyxVz"xL{ ). As an example, if v}|~xz

the number of anomalies detected for normal

behavior with the 8-state HMM is 111 (all are false positives), 520 anomalies with the
RingFile attack (111 false positives), 141 anomalies with the RingFork attack (111 false
positives) and 220 anomalies with the RingMalloc (111 false positives) 1 . Thus, the HMM
1

See Table 5.1
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is detecting all the anomalies produced by the daemon attacks with 0% false negative rate
but with 111 false positives. It is important to observe the impact of the user threshold in
the detection: With

y

almost all the functions in the traces are flagged as anomalous

for the HMMs with 8,14, and 20 states.

Figure 5.15 Detecting daemons attacks in ring with a 8-state HMM

Table 5.2 shows the best training time found using as input for the Baulm-Welch algorithm the normal behavior in process 2.
Figure 5.16 shows the detection of anomalies with a 14-state HMM and Figure 5.17
shows the detection with a 20-state HMM.
Figure 5.18 shows the accuracy of a 8-state HMM for ring-modified when the program
is being executed with interposer attacks. The HMM distinguishes between normal and
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Table 5.2 Training time for the HMM with ring
Number of states
8
14
20

Duration(seconds)
982
176
46

Figure 5.16 Detecting daemons attacks in ring with a 14-state HMM
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Figure 5.17 Detecting daemons attacks in ring with a 20-state HMM

abnormal behavior but the number of false positives is overwhelming. As an example,
using a small threshold

W

, the IDS detects 162 anomalies with normal behavior (all

are false positives), 9201 anomalies with the File attack (3859 false positives) and 6550
anomalies with the MPI attack (6342 false positives). However, the HMMs can be used for
detection since the difference between the number of anomalies of normal and abnormal
behavior is fairly high (in the above example this difference exceeds the 3500 anomalies).
Table 5.3 shows the best training time found using as input for the Baulm-Welch algorithm the normal behavior in process 2.
The accuracy of a 17-state HMM is shown in Figure 5.19 and the accuracy of a 20-state
HMM is presented in Figure 5.20.
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Figure 5.18 Interposer attack in ring-modified with a 8-state HMM

Table 5.3 Training time for the HMM with ring-modified
Number of states
8
17
20

Duration(seconds)
169
89
68
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Figure 5.19 Interposer attack in ring-modified with a 17-state HMM

Figure 5.20 Interposer attack in ring-modified with a 20-state HMM
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Finally, to test the generalization capability of the IDS, we computed the accuracy
of the HMM on processor 2 when the model was created with the normal behavior on
processor 2 (exploiting the SPMD property of ring). Figure 5.21 shows the detection with
a 8-state HMM, Figure 5.22 presents the detection of a 17-state HMM and Figure 5.23
shows the accuracy of a 20-state HMM. The overall detection rate of the HMMs is fairly
similar to the HMMs trained with the normal behavior of process 2.

Figure 5.21 Detecting interposer attacks on processor 4 with a 8-state HMM
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Figure 5.22 Detecting interposer attacks on processor 4 with a 17-state HMM

Figure 5.23 Detecting interposer attacks on processor 4 with a 20-state HMM
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5.3.3

Sequence matching

Figure 5.24 shows the accuracy of the sequence matching algorithm using four different window sizes (

*V** ) for ring with the daemon attacks.

The trace from

process 2 was used as the profile of the application. Using sequences of length 9, the IDS
detects 109 anomalous sequences for the RingMalloc attack (containing 109 anomalous
function calls), 409 anomalous sequences for the RingFile attack (containing 409 anomalous function calls) and 30 anomalous sequences for the RingFork attack (containing 30
anomalies). Thus, the IDS detects 100% of the daemon attacks with 0 false negatives.
Figure 5.25 shows the detection accuracy of the sequence matching algorithm of ringmodified on processor 4.

Figure 5.24 Detecting daemon attacks in ring using Sequence Matching
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Figure 5.25 Detecting interposer attacks in ring-modified using Sequence Matching

The detection accuracy of the sequence matching algorithm for interposer attacks is
again fairly high. As an example, using sequences of length 9 the IDS on processor 2
found 5466 anomalous sequences for the File attack (containing 5342 anomalous function
calls

2

), and 230 anomalous sequences for the MPI attack (containing 217 anomalous

function calls). Similar results were obtained with the others processors. However, the
IDS detects up to 6 false positives in each processor when ring-modified is executed under
normal conditions.

2

The number of anomalous sequences detected by this algorithm might exceed the real number of anomalous function calls. See section 4.2.2 for details.

CHAPTER VI
ONLINE DETECTION
6.1 Simulating online detection

The results obtained in Section 5.3 lead use to believe that both the HMM and the
sequence matching algorithm can be used to implement MPIguard’s Analyzer. We conducted new experiments to determine the accuracy of the detection algorithms in real-time
and the results were plotted where the x-axis corresponds to the position of the function
call in the trace (it can be seen as a time dimension) and the y-axis corresponds to the
number of anomalies identified by the IDS.

6.1.1

Sequence matching

Figure 6.1 compares the normal behavior of processor 3 with the profile created in
processor 2 using the sequence matching algorithm with

~ . It shows that the IDS only

detects a chunk of about 10 anomalies at the end of the trace (false positives).
The File attack creates anomalies when a file F is closed. In ring-modified this occurs
several times during the execution of the program and approximately at the same interval
of time. Figure 6.2 shows that the sequence matching algorithm is able to detect these
anomalies.
71
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Figure 6.1 Comparing normal behavior of ring-modified- using Sequence Matching

Figure 6.2 Detecting File attack in ring-modified-with Sequence Matching
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The MPI attack creates anomalies when the functions MPI Init and MPI Finalize are
executed in the MPI program. In Figure 6.3 we can see that at the beginning of the trace
the IDS detects up to 120 anomalies. Afterwards, no anomalies are detected until the MPI
program is finishing (at the end of the trace), where the IDS detects another 110 anomalies.

Figure 6.3 Detecting MPI attack in ring-modified-Sequence Matching

We concluded that the sequence matching algorithm is suitable for online detection
resulting in few false positives or negatives.
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6.1.2

Hidden Markov Model

Figure 6.4 compares the normal behavior of processor 3 with the profile created in
processor 2 using an HMM with 17 states and

"L

. The HMM detects 2 anomalies

every 500 function calls approximately, resulting in a classification rate of 99.6%. However, the total number of false positives with the ring trace (containing 6500 function calls)
is 162.

Figure 6.4 Monitoring ring-modified- on processor 3 using a 17-state HMM

Figure 6.5 shows the detection rate of the IDS with File attack and Figure 6.6 with the
MPI attack. Almost every function call is being tagged as anomalous, resulting in a very
high false positive rate.
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Figure 6.5 Detecting File attack in ring-modified- using a 17-state HMM

Figure 6.6 Detecting MPI attack in ring-modified- using a 17-state HMM
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These experiments demonstrated that in order to achieve online detection with low
false positive rate we need to improve either the HMM model or the detection algorithm.
The original experiments used the following stop conditions for the Baulm-Welch algorithm:

¡

¢

When the log of the probability of generating the sequence O with the model
less than 0.001.

¡

is

When the number of iterations reaches 1000.

Attempting to build more accurate models, we changed those stop conditions as follows:

¡
¡

When the log of the probability of generating the sequence O with the model
less than 0.0000001 .

¢

is

When the number of iterations reaches 2000.

However, we were not able to find any

¢

with the Baum-Welch algorithm that satisfies

those conditions. Since we could not improve the stochastic model, we tried to modify the
anomaly detection algorithm itself by using a local frame count (LFC) [33]. The LFC is

£¥¤§¦©¨«ª¬¯®±°~ª³² , where ª is the locality frame. Let ´oµ be the
current function call and ¶ the size of the locality frame. ª is given by ª·µ!¸º¹¼»¾½}®À¿ if ´oµ
given by the expression

is anomalous, and 0 otherwise. In our experiments, the total number of anomalies detected
by the HMM is incremented if and only if

£¥¤§¦©¨«ª¬(®Á¶ , i.e. if the last ¶

function calls

were flagged as anomalous.

´

So the new detection algorithm can be expressed as follows: Given a new observation
(that corresponds to the trace of an unseen instance of the MPI/C program, named UT):

1. Using the model
2. Initialize

Ã
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Â

3. For each one of the observations

Æ If ¥Ç È§É©Ê«ÃËÍÌUÎ
Æ

ÄoÅ .

then the counter of anomalies C is increased.

ÏÑÐ

For each one of the states (if the state can be reached from the previous one,
i.e. if the probability of moving to the current state is greater than some user
threshold ) .

Ò

ÄoÅ

Ò

ÓÔÊÖÕØ× ÄoÅÖË

- If the probability of producing the symbol
in the current state
is less than then the function call in the trace UT is labeled as anomalous

Æ If oÄ Å could not be produced by any state (i.e. the function call in the trace was
tagged as anomalous in each state ÏÑÐ ) then compute Ã·Å\ÙºÚ¼ÛÝÜ}ÌßÞ else compute
Ã·Å!ÙºÚ¼Û¾Ü¯Ì~à
4. If C exceeds some user threshold á then the whole trace UT is tagged as anomalous.
With a 17-state HMM using LFC=9 we are able to reduce the number of false positives
when comparing normal behavior on processor 3 with the profile. This can be seen in
Figure 6.7. The HMM detects 40 anomalies at the end of the trace.
Figure 6.8 shows the online detection accuracy of the HMM when the ring-modified
program is executed with the File attack. Finally, even with the improvements described
above the number of false positives of the HMM for the MPI attack is overwhelming (see
Figure 6.9).

Â

Analyzing the detection algorithm and the model we concluded that the large amount
of false positives with this attack is related with the first set of function calls of the trace:
The MPI attack tries to allocate memory 100 times when the function MPI Init is called,
so at least the first 100 function calls can be correctly tagged as anomalous.
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Figure 6.7 Monitoring ring-modified- on processor 3 using an HMM, LFC=9

Figure 6.8 Detecting File attack in ring-modified- using a 17-state HMM, LFC=9
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Figure 6.9 Detecting MPI attack in ring-modified- using a 17-state HMM, LFC=9

Since there are very few distinct sequences of length 9 produced by the attack to
MPI Init and the detection algorithm keeps track of the possible states that can be reached
from the current one, the set of possible next states is dramatically reduced and does not
change over time. When the detection algorithm tries to classify normal sequences (i.e.
after the initial attack) the small subset of states of

â

(the probabilities of transition and

probabilities of producing outputs) that the algorithm is visiting does not contain enough
information to generalize the normal behavior of the program. That is the reason why
the IDS keeps labeling function calls as anomalous even when normal functions are being
presented to the algorithm.
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We have demonstrated that the HMM (with locality frame count) is able to distinguish
between normal and abnormal behavior, but it produces too many false positives when the
program’s trace contains a quite large set of consecutive anomalies.

6.2 The MPI/C program’s profile

By definition the profile must represent the overall behavior of a program under normal conditions and does not change over time. However, it is important to observe that
when analyzing normal behavior of UNIX processes, researchers often find the problem
that is very hard to define a unique flow of events since even with non-complex programs
the interaction of one process with the operating system (file and network system for example) or with other user processes can cause a wide variety of interruptions, system calls
and function calls. Hence it is possible for two identical programs to create different
traces. SPMD applications introduce a new problem, because even with the same set of
instructions on different nodes the input for the algorithms can be different.
As an example, take ring with 4 processors. Using MPIguard’s profiler we obtained
four different traces, three of them can be used as a profile (the first node acts like a master
node, so its behavior differs from the other 3 slave nodes).
The following experiments use profile p2, the program trace of processor 2 containing 6748 calls with 10 different functions and profile p3, the program trace of processor
3 containing 6745 calls and 10 different functions. Figure 6.10 shows the detection of
anomalies of a new execution of Ring with 4 processors. MPIguard’s Analyzer is active in
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the four nodes. As we expected, the IDS detects several anomalies when the Analyzer is
executed in the master node and detects few anomalies for the others processors.

Figure 6.10 Comparing the execution of ring with profile p2

Figure 6.11 repeats this experiment without using the Analyzer on processor 1, so we
can see clearly the detection capability of the IDS when ring is executed under normal
conditions in the slave nodes. The sequences of function calls that the IDS is labeling as
anomalous correspond to the start-up and the end of the MPI communication.
Figure 6.12 depicts the behavior of the Analyzer using profile p3 and the result is very
similar to the detection accuracy using profile p2.
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Figure 6.11 Comparing the execution of slaves nodes of ring with profile p2
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Figure 6.12 Comparing the execution of slaves nodes of ring with profile p3
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We conclude that the trace of any slave processor can be used as a profiler for the IDS:
The only anomalies that we might expect correspond to the beginning and finish of the
MPI communication tasks and specific functionality associated with a nodes as defined in
the source code of the MPI/C program.

6.3 MPIguard’s Analyzer

Figure 3.11 depicts the architecture that we have proposed to analyze the behavior of
the parallel applications in each one of the nodes of the cluster: The Analyzer receives
function calls via shared memory from the interposition library and executes the detection
algorithm. We choose the sequence matching algorithm to instrument the Analyzer because we have demonstrated that it can be used to detect anomalies in real-time of MPI/C
programs with low false or negative rates. The set of parameters that the Analyzer needs
are:
1. Profile of the application (an ASCII file containing the function call trace that represents normal behavior of the application).
2. Window size.
3. Output file.

6.4 Monitoring complex applications

We have demonstrated that MPIguard is able to detect anomalies in real-time for
MPI/C programs running in a Linux cluster. However, we collected data from small parallel applications such as IS, ring and ring-modified, and we produced traces with no more
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than 7000 function calls using the default configuration file of MPIguard. In practice, commercial and scientific parallel applications use algorithms with complex communication
patterns that generally need several hours or even days to be completed.

6.4.1

Implementing LLCBench2

We wanted to build an MPI application complex enough to demonstrate the use of
MPIguard for large parallel programs. We decided to modify the source code of LLCbench
[27], an application that includes three point-to-point benchmark routines, Latency, bandwidth and bidirectional bandwidth, and 5 broadcast benchmark routines: roundtrip, broadcast, reduce, allreduce, and all-to-all. The point-to-point routines involve communication
from the master node to the last node in the rank of communication, whereas the broadcast routines involve all the processors. Thus, to monitor the behavior of LLCbench in the
cluster when it is executed with 4 processors we need 3 profiles: one for the master node,
one for the last node (rank size-1) and one for the other two processors.
This new application selects one MPI routine based on a normally distributed random
number generator, with the mean and the standard deviation computed experimentally to
execute reduce more often than the others broadcast routines, and to execute the pointto-point benchmark routines only a few times. This process is repeated 5000 times. Figure 6.13 presents the main function of LLCbench2. The mean of the normal distribution
is 4 (i.e. reduce) and the standard deviation is 1.5. Figure 6.14 shows an example of the
distribution of the subroutines executed by LLCbench2.
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Figure 6.13 The main function of LLCbench2
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Figure 6.14 Distribution of the subroutines of LLCbench2

6.4.2

Monitoring LLCbench2

Table 6.1 shows the size of the profile for every processor where LLCbench2 was executed. We obtained traces with more than one million function calls, and as we expected,
the traces from processor 2 and processor 3 are identical and they can be monitored using
the same profile.
Deploying MPIGuard’s Analyzer in the cluster and executing LLCbench2 with 4 processors produced very low false positives rates as shown in Table 6.2. It is very important
to observe that the traces produced by LLCbench2 in each node change every time the program is executed. However, the profile can be used because the communication patterns of
LLCbench2 tends to be constant as in many real world parallel applications, and because
of the large sample size.
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Table 6.1 Size of LLCbench2 traces
Node
Number of function calls
microcosm1
1515710
microcosm2
1050364
microcosm3
1050364
microcosm4
1413784

Table 6.2 Number of false positives for LLCbench2
Node
False positives
microcosm1
0
microcosm2
4
microcosm3
0
microcosm4
4

As another example of the capabilities of MPIguard, we executed LLCbench2 with the
MPI-attack defined in Section 5.3. Figure 6.15 shows the number of anomalies reported
by MPIguard in time space for the master node at the beginning of the execution and
Figure 6.16 shows the detection at the end of the execution. As expected, MPIguard is
able to detect the MPI-attack.

6.4.3

LU factorization

As a final example, we have chosen an application implemented by Dandass to improve the Gaussian elimination method for solving systems of linear equations such as

ã³äåçæ

using the LU factorization method [6]. The factorization is distributed among a

2 dimensional grid of processors and “. . . in order to improve efficiency, the distribution
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Figure 6.15 Detection MPI-attack at the beginning of LLCbench2

Figure 6.16 Detection MPI-attack at the ending of LLCbench2
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scheme must be designed to minimize load imbalance by distributing the“active” elements
as evenly as possible across all processors.” [6, p.4]
Figure 6.17 shows the numbers of anomalies reported by MPIguard when the LU factorization algorithm for a 1000x1000 matrix using a block size of 10 elements is executed
under normal conditions with 4 processors. Once again, the anomalies detected by the
Analyzer correspond to start-up and end of the MPI communication. The maximum number of false positives produced by MPIguard in a processor was 121. In order to improve
the detection rate, we used MPIguard’s Profiler to generate the traces of 10 executions
of the LU factorization. By doing this, MPIguard is able to learn more function call sequences that represent the normal behavior of the MPI application. The results are shown
in Figure 6.18. The maximum number of anomalies generated by MPIguard is reduced
to 54. This experiment demonstrates one of the most powerful features of MPIguard: the
ability to learn normal behavior from several executions of an MPI application. Finally,
Figure 6.19 shows the detection of the MPI-attack for the LU factorization application on
processor 1.
The traces produced by this algorithm are smaller than the traces produced by LLCbench2, but the communication patterns of LU-factorization are much more complex,
and it is a good example of the type of scientific programs that are executed on a cluster
of workstations. It is important to observe that although this program was implemented in
C++, MPIguard is able to collect and analyze the function call traces of libc and libmpipro
without modification of its source code or configuration files.
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Figure 6.17 Monitoring LU-factorization on 4 processors

Figure 6.18 Monitoring LU-factorization using a profile with 10 executions
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Figure 6.19 Detecting interposer attacks in LU-factorization

6.5 Performance

Figure 6.20 shows the latency of MPI Send using LLCbench [27] with 4 processors
and 20 iterations and Figure 6.21 shows the average bandwidth between the master and
one slave node using unidirectional transmissions.
Measuring the performance of an application is a difficult task and it has been an
interesting field of research. We attempted to measured the performance of MPIguard
for two case scenarios: when the parallel application performs extensive computations
with few messages and when the parallel application generates several messages among
processors with little local computation. When the application executes local computation
without the use of a library, MPIguard is idle. The application selected for the first test
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Figure 6.20 Comparison of MPI Send latency with LLCbench using MPIguard
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Figure 6.21 Comparison of the bandwidth with LLCbench using MPIguard

scenario was LU-factorization and for the second was LLCbench2. The startup time of the
Analyzer on each node was ignored and the experiments were conducted 20 times.
Table 6.3 shows the average overhead in seconds produced by MPIguard’s Profiler
and Analyzer for LU-factorization. An overhead of 2.48% is generated when the Profiler
is active and of 3.37% when the Analyzer is executed.
As we explained before, LLCbench2 is an extreme example of message passing because it does not perform local computation and executes 5000 point-to-point and broadcast MPI functions. Also, it executes several memory and string functions from libc. Table 6.4 shows the average overhead produced by MPIguard for LLCbench2. The Profiler
produces an overhead of 20.84%. This increase on the execution of the parallel applica-
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Table 6.3 Performance of MPIguard for LU-factorization
Task
LU-factorization
Profiling LU-factorization
Monitoring LU-factorization

Mean Duration(seconds) Standard deviation
104.27
1.11
106.94
2.77
107.79
2.91

tion is due to inefficient disk access, because in the current implementation, every function
call that is intercepted by the Profiler is written on disk. Furthermore, the trace produced
by LLCbench2 contains more than 1.5 million function calls. However, it is important to
observe that for each MPI application the Profiler only needs to be executed a few times.
The Analyzer, application that only access the disk during its start-up to create the sorted
tree, produces an overhead of 15.58%.

Table 6.4 Performance of MPIguard for LLCbench2
Task
LLCbench2
Profiling LLCbench2
Monitoring LLCbench2

Mean Duration(seconds) Standard deviation
1083.57
48.05
1309.41
67.51
1252.44
71.53

In summary, these results show that MPIguard produces an acceptable overhead of less
that 5% when the MPI application performs some local computations (comparable with
any other monitoring system), but there is a great impact on the performance when the
number of local computations is low in each node. However, there are several factors that
we have to take into account to measure the performance of MPIguard, among them the
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benchmark algorithm used, the number and type of functions being profiled, the status
of the network in the cluster, and the available resources in each node. An example of
the impact of those factors on the 8-nodes cluster used for testing MPIguard can be seen
in Table 6.4, where the standard deviation of the experiments with LLCbench2 with and
without MPIguard is quite large.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated that sequences of function calls can be used to verify the correct
execution of an MPI parallel program in a cluster of Linux workstations. When the applications are executed under normal conditions, the only set of anomalies that we expect to
find correspond to function calls that allow the start-up and end of MPI communication.
We have implemented MPIguard, the first distributed-IDS approach implemented for
a high-performance environment, that is able to collect and analyze sequences of function
calls of any C library for dynamic linked programs. The Profiler collects function calls for
each node and creates the profile of the MPI application. This module can be also used for
debugging or logging. The Analyzer, executed in each node of the cluster, reads the profile
of the current MPI executable and executes the detection algorithm. As a result of our
experiments, we concluded that the sequence matching algorithm has a better detection
rate than the Hidden Markov Model . However, we believe that the data model provided
by the HMM is very powerful for large parallel applications and we expect to present an
empirical analysis of the detection capabilities of the HMM for the anomaly detection task
using sequences of function calls.
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We created artificial datasets to demonstrate the detection capabilities of the algorithms, and we implemented new attacks for MPI programs. We conducted experiments
with MPIguard in off-line and on-line mode and showed that we can achieve low false
positive and false negative rate.
MPIguard can be used not only to detect intrusions, but also it can be used as a fault
detection mechanism. Even more, MPIguard’s architecture allows the incorporation of
additional sensors to monitor attributes such as memory usage or idle time of a process.
With such a configuration, a new tool can be implemented on top of MPIguard to react
when a anomaly has been found. Also, MPIguard’s architecture provides de ability to
collect and monitor function calls for more than one program, profiling a complete work
session in the cluster. Experiments need to be conducted to demonstrate that MPIguard is
still accurate in such a scenario.
MPIguard is highly portable to others UNIX-like systems, because the implementation
of the interposition library and the shared memory communication was done with the
standard C library. Furthermore, there is not need for kernel modification or root access.
Finally, although MPIguard’s current implementation achieves low overhead when the
MPI application performs local computations and its performance can be competitive with
any other IDS system, we still need to investigate the performance of the Profiler and the
Analyzer in a real-world cluster.
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